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1. Introduction
Growing awareness of
the role of food quality and
safety has led to the rise of
national and international
laws, often restrictive, that
deeply changed production
practices and organization
of supply chains.
Presence of asymmetric
information between pro-
duction and consumption
phases, together with ex-
ternalities associated to
food consumption related
to ensure protection of
"basic" requirements to
consumers, such as health,
information, fair trade, jus-
tifies public intervention
concerning the implemen-
tation of regulation on
standards and control sys-
tem. The Public Authority
operates through different
levels and modes of regu-
lation (mandatory public standards, regional or national cer-
tification schemes, etc.), correcting market failures and ensur-
ing the achievement of optimal quality levels. Beside public
intervention, we see the development of private initiatives to
normalize quality, which aims to guarantee product safety and
quality, safeguarding the reputation of companies and, in
some cases, providing basis for the achievement of a compet-
itive differentiation advantage in the market (Henson and
Reardon, 2005). These actions not only affect the level of
quality offered to the final consumer (and, therefore, the ef-
fectiveness of public intervention), but also change the inter-
nal organization of enter-
prises, imposing signifi-
cant costs of compliance,
which may lead to the ex-
clusion of weaker produc-
ers by market transactions
(Garcia et al., 2004; Ham-
moudi et al., 2010).
These initiatives deeply
modify the existing organi-
zations within sectors and
positioning or reposition-
ing of the strategic players,
by strengthening or revers-
ing some balance of power.
They also induce the emer-
gence of methods of up-
stream/downstream con-
tracting and they steer or-
ganizations, which have to
combine coordination be-
tween trade relations and
individual strategies in the
implementation of systems
of control and certification
procedures (Demirbas et
al., 2006).
Within the normalization of fruit and vegetable supply
chains, there is an increasing attention to technical measures
(regulation of health security, with regard to the presence of
pesticides and definition of maximum residue levels of ac-
tive principles, as well as labelling requirements or quality
standards), which may act both as a barrier to trade like tar-
iffs and quantitative restrictions, and to guarantee the protec-
tion of consumer about products health requirements.
Regulatory compliance costs related to information and
adaptation to standards and the heterogeneity of quality and
safety standards are among the factors that affect strategic
choices of operators, especially of importing companies, as
responsible for complying with health and quality standards
of imported products. Moreover, these factors also affect
positively fruit and vegetable exports of producer countries.
Some authors show the “effects of inclusion” of opportuni-
Strategic behaviour of Italian fruit and vegetables
importers from South Mediterranean Countries faced
with food safety standards
Giulio MALORGIO*, Beatrice BIONDI*, Maria Angela PERITO**
Abstract
The aim of this study was to analyse the heterogeneity of Italian specialized importers
in Southern Mediterranean Countries. We analysed a national representative sample
and defined a profile of companies according to the safety of fruit and vegetable im-
ports, organization of chain by suppliers and clients and efforts in safety controls. We
showed that the type of supply chain affects the importers’ strategies encouraging
them to implement stricter standards, such as private standards, with respect to pub-
lic law in order to meet customer needs and provide a sufficient degree of differentia-
tion. These strategies, however, are not always aimed at obtaining a price premium,
but are taken above all to ensure the maintenance of the reputation of the companies
towards the most demanding customers and stabilize its market share.
Keywords: Food safety, standards, import, international trade, fruit and vegetables,
Mediterranean.
Résumé
Le but de ce travail était d’analyser l’hétérogénéité des importateurs italiens spé-
cialisés au niveau des pays du Sud de la Méditerranée. Nous avons examiné un
échantillon représentatif et défini un profil des entreprises en considérant la sécu-
rité des importations de fruits et légumes, l’organisation de la chaîne du fournisseur
au client et les efforts déployés sur le plan des contrôles sanitaires. Nous avons
montré que le type de chaîne d’approvisionnement influe sur les stratégies des im-
portateurs, en les encourageant à appliquer des normes de qualité plus strictes,
telles les normes privées, que les normes règlementaires publiques afin de répon-
dre aux besoins des clients et d’assurer un niveau suffisant de différenciation.
Toutefois, ces stratégies ne visent pas toujours à obtenir une majoration du prix,
mais elles sont surtout adoptées pour maintenir la réputation des entreprises auprès
des clients les plus exigeants et stabiliser leurs parts de marché.
Mots- clés: Sécurité sanitaire, référentiels, importation, commerce international,
fruits et légumes, Méditerranée.
29
* Department of Agricultural and Food Sciences, University of
Bologna, Italy
** Faculty of Bioscience and Agro-Food and Environmental Tech-
nology, University of Teramo, UNITE, Teramo, Italy.
Corresponding author: giulio.malorgio@unibo.it
Jel codes: Q13, Q16, L51
NEW MEDIT N. 3/2016
ties for producers of developing countries and the benefits
in terms of income and productivity for producers who have
achieved compliance (Giraud-Héraud et al., 2011; Lee et
al., 2010). It could be the case of the southern Mediter-
ranean exports towards the European Union and Italy.
Mediterranean countries constitute a significant trading part-
ner of the European Union in the fruit and vegetables sector
with a 24% share of imports to the EU. Italy imported in 2014
about 630 million euro of fresh vegetables, of which approxi-
mately 30% from Southern Mediterranean countries (SMCs),
with significant growth in the last 10 years. The main export-
ing country of vegetables (mainly potatoes, artichokes, fresh
vegetables, tomatoes and onions) is Egypt that represents for
Italy about 75% of horticultural imports from SMCs, followed
by Tunisia and Turkey with 11% and 7%,respectively.
With regard to fresh fruit, Italian imports amounted to
about 1.490 million euro of fresh fruit. The main exporting
country is Turkey with 68%, followed by Tunisia and E-
gypt, with 10% and 8% respectively.
The Mediterranean area has regained a central position in
global economic and commercial relations, with the evolu-
tion of logistics and transport management. 
Growing dynamism of imports by the SMCs, combined
with an increased level of attention to health benefits con-
ditions by public authorities and Italian and European con-
sumers, require specific organizational procedures and
business to all the operators, which conduct business at
every stage of the fruit and vegetables supply chain. Re-
searched organisational arrangements should encourage ex-
porting countries to the adoption of production practices
that are compatible with the requirements of products
health safety and quality. At the same time, traders are en-
couraged to undertake strategic behaviour (with more or
less rigid adoption of a control and certification system re-
garding quality and health of imported products), depend-
ing on type, size, relationship with upstream and down-
stream operators and the target market of their production.
In most countries of the region (Morocco, Egypt, Tunisia,
Turkey), supply chain structures in the fruit and vegetable sec-
tor are in a stage of shifting from government-controlled in-
stitutions towards increased participation of private structures.
Exports are handled mainly through independent commis-
sioners who work on the basis of consignments and operate
on spot markets (central wholesale markets), or trough larger
buying/packing houses (mostly private and co-operative
owned), which are focusing on supplying either wholesalers
in importing countries or buying centres of retail chains and
other large institutional buyers, that apply modern supply
chain management methods (Ait Hou et al., 2015). 
Those firms are more suitable to integrate in large Euro-
pean supply chain, and to fulfil their high food safety stan-
dards, marketing and logistical needs. Requirements con-
cerning certification and application of tracking and tracing
techniques, could be thus met by the largest and best or-
ganized of those exporting firms, while those operating in a
consignment basis will face increased difficulties to have
access to the European retailer chains, which actually im-
pose such requirements (Kalaitzis et al., 2007).
Our analysis concerns quality organization in imported
fruit and vegetable supply chains from countries on the
southern coast of the Mediterranean, public and private
health checks system and coordination forms in commer-
cial relations adopted to ensure products health safety.
The aim is to investigate quality and safety in the sectors of
fruit and vegetable imports and, particularly, the role of the s-
trategic behaviour of operators (exporters / importers / whole-
salers / big retailers) towards quality and health safety accord-
ing to the company structure, the supply chain organization
and the type of target market. Or better, what factors deter-
mine the strategic interest of companies to implement private
initiatives for standardisation (market benefit, quality percep-
tion by consumers, compliance and coordination costs, etc.)?
The analysis, therefore, identifies different types of "in-
ternational chains", depending on various factors, and their
integration in the strategic behaviour of the operators in the
supply chain. In particular, the first part of the work consists
of the conceptual framework on the problems concerning
the behaviour of importers about aspects of food safety and
quality. In the second part we will describe the methodolo-
gy and the assumptions with which the work is being ad-
dressed. Then we will analyse the survey results, carried out
on a sample of Italian firms importing fruit and vegetables
from the North Mediterranean countries. 
The analysis of the sample will be performed starting
from some assumptions in this third part of the work, to
build an analytical framework on the fruit and vegetable
importers heterogeneity, to understand (i) if Italian im-
porters are characterized by different profiles of importers
and what are the differences and (ii) if firm’s size can or
cannot influence safety behaviours along supply chain. 
2. Public and private strategies on health
safety for imported food products
Food safety and quality standards can be promoted in a
variety of institutional forms that differ in the extent, to
which users have freedom of choice and action regarding
compliance; also they differ in the role of the public and
private sectors with the promulgation and / or application of
these standards (Henson, 2008).
Reducing the risk associated with food hazards for human
health and consumer protection from fraud due to artificial d-
ifferentiation of products provide the basis for implementa-
tion of public standards. With regard to imports of fruit and
vegetables, public regulation at European level is mainly
based on the presence of active substances and on the level of
the minimum residues limit (MRL), applied through inspec-
tion and control of imported products (EU Reg. 396/2005). P-
resence of certain active substances prohibited by European
legislation and exceeding the minimum residue limit, pre-
vents the importation of products (EU Reg. 1881/2006).
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However, if public standards are ineffective or inadequate
for an efficient organization of market and consumer infor-
mation, companies seek to approved private standards such
as alternative means to provide consumers with the desired
level of security (Henson and Reardon, 2005).
Regardless of prevalence on public standards, private
safety and quality standards have become a predominant
basis for product differentiation in markets where competi-
tion is increasingly founded on quality. These standards
take the form of technical specifications, definitions and
principles through which goods are categorized or included
in product groupings. The reasons for growth of private
standards, therefore reside in mitigating reputational and
business risks associated with food safety, partially related
to the level and nature of public regulatory requirements, in
addition to product differentiation based on quality modes
that affect the supply chain (Henson and Caswell, 1999).
These instruments have received a strong impulse in large
food distribution chains, both because of their considerable
market power and competitive strategies which link reputa-
tion and performance of a firm to the quality provided by its
products (Bergès-Sennou et al., 2004).
The growth of supermarkets has seen a shift from spot
markets toward the use of specialized wholesalers
(Berdegué et al., 2007), the increase of coordination system
with a dominance of supply chain buyer-driven organiza-
tion on global scale addressed to the buyers (Gereffi et al.,
2003; Hammoudi et al., 2009), and the growth of private
quality and safety standards (Pingali et al., 2005).
In a world in which private standards are predominant,
the core issue for every operator is gaining access to a sup-
ply chain buyer-driven rather than to a specific national
market (Dolan and Humphrey, 2000). 
Private initiatives are interpreted as "more demanding"
respect to public regulation, and this from three different
points of view (Henson and Humphrey, 2009):
private standards set a more demanding level for some at-
tributes of the food and / or add to the health security rules
(public regulation). For example, standards such as BRC,
IFS or ISO 22000 integrates environmental impact and so-
cial responsibility matters; Private Field to Fork standard
(Marks and Spencer) integrates the 70 pesticides ban re-
garding fruit and vegetables to be sold fresh (or as ingredi-
ents in prepared foods sold for private label brands);
private standards tend to be more "specific" about the
means (to achieve objectives) and to the processes than leg-
islation, that often only requires "obligations of result." If
legislation merely defines basic parameters of a health se-
curity system or prescribes the obligation of a control sys-
tem, private standards are involved to clarify conditions of
effectiveness of such a system or instructions and provide
regulatory oversight of specific requirements;
private standards tend to vertically extend legislation cov-
erage. GlobalGap standards, for example, are standard
processes aimed at ensuring the compliance of the final
product to a product standard (specifically, the European
regulation setting maximum residue limits for pesticides in
fruit and vegetables); process requirements specified by
private standard are designed to ensure compliance with a
health safety standard concerning characteristics of the fi-
nal product.
Despite differentiation, traders adopt different behaviours
in the use of private standards on health safety and supply
chain control, based on the brand reputation, size of firm
and type of downstream chain.
Rouviere et al. (2010) demonstrated that higher turnover
of firms adversely affects safety controls in a survey con-
ducted on a sample of fruit and vegetable importers in
France. In their empirical setting the authors validate the
negative link between firm size and the level of safety ef-
fort. Furthermore, they show that public authorities could
directly affect firms’ behaviour by taking account of their
intrinsic characteristics; also they could indirectly influence
firms’ safety efforts. They could exert pressure on down-
stream operators who would transfer this pressure to their
suppliers.
Importers for large retail chains indirectly increase the
firm’s safety efforts, and the number of suppliers has a pos-
itive correlation in controls by the importer in the procure-
ment of the product. More specifically, the identification of
suppliers involves a search of expensive information, in
particular if the enterprises require a wide variety of sup-
plies or a high level of health standards. Therefore, compa-
nies choose to implement coordinated strategy to monitor
the production process along the supply chain. This pro-
vides an incentive to the implementation of private stan-
dards to reduce transaction costs (Holleran et al., 1999). 
Latouche and Rouviere (2011) distinguish two import
chains associated with two different types of traders: bro-
kers and retailers. While the first importer allocates the
product once imported to different clients by adopting a
form of indirect sales channel, retailers buy the products to
enter them directly in the final market. Therefore, private
standards for retailers would reduce information asymme-
tries and transaction costs for research and control, in the
same way as compliance with public quality standards. 
Private standards and certification perform a risk man-
agement function and procurement regulation in intermedi-
ary market (Giraud-Héraud et al., 2012). The main objec-
tive, in this case, is to provide additional security for firms
against the risk of food safety failures and the consequent s-
trategic costs (e.g. loss of market share, erosion of brand
capital) and operational costs (products recall, customer
complaints and penalties from enforcement authorities). 
3. Survey design and research methodology 
The study was carried out as a part of the Arimnet proj-
ect. One of the goals of the project was to determine strate-
gic behaviours of fruit and vegetable import from SMCs by
three European countries (France, Spain and Italy). In our
work, a survey was performed in 2014 among various Ital-
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ian fruit and vegetable traders, in order to highlight the het-
erogeneity of food chains. Particularly the analysis tries to
understand the food safety strategies of importers as a func-
tion of the size and type of the firm’s clients and suppliers;
moreover, we have tried to explain the attitudes and behav-
iours of stakeholders and the constraints imposed by im-
porters to suppliers (standards, obligations imposed up-
stream on the production, checks on the final product, etc.).
Small importers compose the structure of Italian imports.
Many of these importers may not stay on wholesale mar-
kets. Nevertheless, the monitoring system is also extremely
problematic, given the extreme abundance of national w-
holesale markets. The attempts at interviews were made on
the wholesale markets of Bologna, Rome, Fondi, Naples
and Catania. Notwithstanding, this line did not produce any
results, due to the importers dimensions and organization:
in fact, they often are not able to buy directly from SMCs
suppliers, mainly for reasons related to administrative pro-
cedures and logistics structure of imports. Indeed, they pre-
fer trading products imported from North Africa, from S-
pain (Mercabarna Wholesale) and France (Marché de Gros
de Perpignan Méditerranée).
Therefore, to be sure to interview the leading importers,
our analysis took into account the Fruitimprese database.
Fruitimprese is the Italian Association of fruit and vegeta-
bles export-import companies; it works with the companies
to support and favour their commercial development. Con-
sidering the role of Fruitimprese in Italy, we submitted a
questionnaire to all the associated companies (100 compa-
nies). 
The survey was conducted with a questionnaire organized
in four parts. Respondents were asked about general infor-
mation on their company (turnover, main import products,
main countries), supplier and upstream relationships, man-
agement and quality/health security controls and, finally,
customer and downstream relationships. The questionnaire
was tested during a specific interview with the director of
fruit and vegetable market of Bologna (CAAB) and the di-
rector of Fruitimprese.
We submitted the questionnaire by e-mail and later all the
companies were called by telephone. The phone calls high-
lighted that more than half of the companies are engaged in
import outside the region of interest (North Africa), in par-
ticular the trade of these companies is developed in imports
of bananas and other tropical fruits. For this reason we
analysed only companies with direct importation from
South Mediterranean countries, but among these companies
about ten did not answer to the questionnaire. 
Hence, the sample includes 23 companies (members of
Fruitimprese of the main Italian regions: Emilia-Romagna,
Puglia, Campania, etc.) with fruit and vegetable importa-
tion from South Mediterranean countries. The limited
sources of information to support the analysis were sub-
stantially offset by the availability of large number of vari-
ables from the questionnaires.
Considering classical method of statistical analysis, sig-
nificant differences in the joint distribution of the items
have been tested by means of Pearson χ2 tests. Moreover,
in order to test the differences in average value of continu-
ous variables between sub-groups of observations, T-test
have been used.
To analyse the strategic behaviour of Italian fruit and veg-
etables importers face to food safety regulation we realized
a typological analysis of companies in the analysed sample.
First, some findings were obtained from the interpretation
of the grouped companies by type of first customer and type
of first supplier. Then, multiple correspondence analysis
was conducted on the dataset: this methodology enables us
to reproduce variability (and association) of many initial
variables in a smaller number of new variables. We consid-
er a risk-averse importer who is uncertain about the safety
of fresh produce he markets and therefore decides to moni-
tor voluntarily some boxes to ensure compliance with a
health safety standard and more efficiency along the chain.
To do so, he conducts laboratory analyses to check whether
there are pesticide residues on produce.
Furthermore, the effectiveness of correspondence analy-
sis is not affected by the small sample size. Relationships a-
mong turnover of firms, type of first supplier, type of first
client, certification of the company, certification based on
customer demand, certification requested to suppliers by
companies, and effort on safety have been examined. 
4. Results
The sample characteristics are presented in Table 1. The
gathered sample includes 23 companies; these companies
are mainly importers/wholesalers, furthermore one compa-
ny in a three is importing almost exclusively, with 70% or
more of its revenues derived from import activity.
A percentage of 31% of the sample includes companies
with high turnover (100 million Euro or more), 17% of the
sample have turnover between 50 and 99 million € and the
remaining 52% gains less than 50 million Euro per year. As
already mentioned, this structure does not reflect the over-
all Italian situation because of the selection of importers
analysed (companies associated to Fruitimprese). 
The composition of the sample by imported quantity
shows an equal percentage of firms importing less than 500
tons and between 500 and 5,000 tons (30%), the remaining
share imports 5,000 tons or more.
Getting more in depth with the description of the sample,
on average 34% of the whole fruit and vegetables imported
by firms comes from the Mediterranean area; this evidence
reflect the overall Italian share of imports from the Med
area. Regarding the total number of companies, 23% of
them buy fresh products exclusively from Med Countries.
In the collected sample, companies import goods from
EU/non-EU countries with similar shares: on average 45%
of fruit and vegetables imported by firms comes from intra-
European and 55% from non-European countries. 
The most mentioned countries from which the companies
import are Egypt (44% of the firms has commercial rela-
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tionship with this nation), Turkey (39%) and Israel (13%).
Shifting the focus on products, citrus seem to be import-
ed from Mediterranean by a large number of companies
(44%), followed by cherries (22%), strawberries (17%) and
potatoes (13%).
The nature of traders has been highlighted: nearly 80% of
the companies have more than one supplier, on average
they have five suppliers per company. The first kind of sup-
pliers is mostly exporters (52%), followed by producers
(30%) and foreign wholesalers (13%). The main customers
of the importers are big retailers; in particular, 61% of com-
panies sell their products mostly to GMS / HD, 26% sells to
national wholesaler, 9% to international and only 4% de-
clare to sell to importers or specialized networks. A per-
centage of 43% are specialized in terms of range of prod-
ucts, they import only one or two different products (main-
ly cherries and citrus).
Our survey showed as import chains from MCs in Italy
have specific kind of procurement system based on special-
ized agents. These agents are capable to assure a consistent
supply through “preferred suppliers”, producers or “spe-
cialized wholesalers”. The type of supply chain also de-
pends on the type of customer (traditional/national whole-
salers, international wholesalers or big retailer) (Figure 1). 
In our study we observed how different is the organiza-
tion of import chains, as well as different is the strategic be-
havior that operators put in place to reach the final market.
We have national and international wholesalers that provide
import to supply the wholesale markets as final destination
the small and traditional retail. In this case, imports may
have mixed products, in terms of certifications, allowing
the needs of the national customer. In chains with super-
markets and hypermarkets, importers adopt voluntary codes
of good practices (GlobalGap, BRC, IFN and ISO) for the
achievement of this particular group of clients.
A very significant proportion of importers say they are
certified (78%), and the same companies ask the certifica-
tion to suppliers; in fact, 78% of suppliers are certified.
Analysing the type of certification requested by importers
to suppliers, we found that over 60% requires more than
one certification: in particular, 94% ask for Global-Gap,
33% IFS, 28% ISO 9001 or ISO 9002 and another 28%
BRC.
On the other hand, 74% of customers ask to the company
certified products, and a percentage of 65% require certifi-
cation from suppliers. They appear even more demanding
than companies about certain certification (Figure 2).
The results across the analysis confirm that companies
with a higher turnover realize more analysis, monitoring
and contaminant research. We divided the number of analy-
sis made per year in two categories: less than 100 vs 100 or
more. It seems reasonable to think that a dependence exists
between turnover and effort made in controls: higher
turnover often means higher imported quantity, thus the
number of controls made should rise proportionally. In fact,
we found significant difference in proportion of effort made
at different turnover; if the continuous variable of number
of analysis is taken into account, also a significant differ-
ence in the average in relation to different turnover appears.
However, if the number of analysis is divided by tons of im-
port, obtaining the number of analysis per ton of product
imported, the relation between this number and turnover
class reversed, although it is not significant (Table 4). 
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Table 1 - Some characteristics of the sample.
Figure 1 - Suppliers’ typologies and upstream relations.
Source: authors’ elaboration. 
Figure 2 - Type of certification requested to suppliers by companies
and customers.
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Thus, our empirical results suggest that firms’ safety efforts
are linked to their size: firms with greater turnover perform
more controls, although not proportionally to the quantities
imported. This means that large firms make of course more
controls, but the number of controls per ton imported is low-
er than the one in smaller firms. Although it is not statistical-
ly significant, probably due to the small sample size, our re-
sult seems to confirm the evidence obtained by Rouviere et al.
(2010), showing that French importers adopt differentiated
behaviour in terms of food safety efforts: number of analyses
on safety standards per million Euro or turnover is lower if the
firm is larger. Unlike Rouviere, we decided to use the number
of analyses per ton imported, considering it more appropriate
to evaluate the effort of firms. 
It is worthwhile to remember that if the margin of error and
degree of confidence of an estimation is fixed, an increase in
the size of population corresponds to a less than proportional
increase of the sample size. Thus, for a company importing
high quantity of fruit and vegetables, there is no need to in-
crement proportionally the number of analysis to obtain the
same precision in estimation of a company importing less. 
In terms of downstream operators, the type of the main cus-
tomer is not significant (Pearson χ2 Test sign.= 0,147). The
propensity for firms to work with supermarkets, hypermarkets
and big catering companies do not affect their safety efforts
made. Some studies show that big retailers do not explicitly
ask for safety and suppliers certify their products regardless
(García and Poole, 2004). In all probability if suppliers fail to
achieve an agreement with some retailers, they can switch
their delivery to other customers (as national wholesalers, in-
ternational wholesalers or Horeca). According to von Schlip-
penbach and Teichmann (2012) and Russo et al. (2014), we
can see these aspects in the opposite way; namely, suppliers
have in any case high quality standards because if they don’t
achieve an agreement with the selected downstream firm,
they can only sell the products to the other downstream firm.
Besides these results, we have observed from the sample
that firms adopt different behaviour in voluntary programmes
on food safety based on their specific characteristics and sup-
ply chains in which they are.
Distinctions based on type of first supplier and type of first
customer are considered below.
Among those who primarily import from producers, there
are medium to large companies in terms of turnover; they
mainly sell to the GMS; they have a high share of contractu-
al relationships with customers and suppliers (> 50%); 86%
indicates that customers require certification.
Among those who primarily import from exporters, we find
strong companies in terms of effort (42% make more than 100
inspections per year); they are certified companies and require
certification to suppliers (92% in both cases); they sell to na-
tional wholesalers; a half has no contractual relationships with
customers.
Among those who primarily import from wholesalers, we
find small companies; with low effort; not certified; with low
share of contractual relationships with suppliers; and who do
not require certifications to suppliers and customers do not re-
quire it too; they sell to traditional retail and national whole-
salers.
A clear distinction appears between companies which sell
primarily to national wholesalers and to GMS: in the first
group there are small companies with low effort made on
controls; they are not certified and do not require certifica-
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Table 2 - Joint distribution of turnover and effort in analysis.
Table 3 - Pearson χ2 Test: significant difference in proportion of effort
made at different turnover.
Table 4 - T-test
Table 5 - Type of first supplier.
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tion to suppliers / also customers do not ask for it; they have
few contractual relationships with both suppliers and cus-
tomers; they mainly import from exporters and foreign w-
holesalers.
Among those who primarily sell to GMS, there are large
companies with high effort made on controls; they are cer-
tified; they have more than half of the total contractual re-
lationships of suppliers and customers; they mainly import
from cooperatives and producers.
Associations between turnover, safety management, type of
supplier and client along the supply chain were explored us-
ing a multiple correspondence analysis (MCA). The MCA has
enabled to analyse 7 variables and 20 associated modality1.
In particular, we found that two variables are able to repro-
duce 75% of the total inertia of the initial system.
The output of the correspondence analysis is shown in fig-
ure 3, in which three principal groups of companies could be
distinguished according to the proximity of the points on the
two-dimensional map. We have named these groups as: im-
porters in certified chain (blue circle – Group 1); importers in
“differentiating certified chain” (red circle-Group 2); im-
porters in not certified chains (yellow circle-Group 3).
The first type of firms (in certified supply chain), with
medium turnover (from 50 to 99 million €), has a well-or-
ganized fresh produce supply chain that gives the possibil-
ity to meet the offered challenges in European markets and
take advantage of the associated opportunities. In particu-
lar, these companies are specialized in few imported prod-
ucts, they ask at their supplier specific certifications on the
bought products and they offer products at their customers
with a high level of certification. In addition, members of
this group make high efforts relating to safety controls. In
this profile there are mainly importers supplying to large re-
tailers that require the results of pesticides. Integrating
backwards with retailer has been probably motivated by a
large number of factors; the main ones for retailer being to
gain more control over supplies.
Looking at the red circle, we cannot find any modality of
variables regarding certification required by customers or re-
quired certification to suppliers. Therefore, companies in this
group do not show any explicit behavior referred to the chain.
In this group there are companies with high turnover (100
million Euros or more), which mainly import from exporters
and resell mostly to GMS; they are certified, but there is no
clear indication to certified chain. Thus, this group (called “d-
ifferentiating certified chain”) may contain companies that
can afford to change their type of supply chain based on the
situation at the time; in addition, these companies do not have
a well-defined behavior with regard to effort.
No certified chain. In this group we have companies with s-
maller turnover that mostly work with wholesalers. These
companies are not only certified and do not provide a signifi-
cant health effort, but also do not work in a certified chain.
Conclusion
Over the past two decades, developing countries have
achieved comparatively significant growth in their exports
of fruit and vegetable products. In particular, fresh fruit and
vegetables production for export has grown rapidly in a
number of North African countries over the past decade.
Gereffi (2003) has highlighted the increasing role played by in-
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Table 6 - Type of first customer.
Figure 3 - Output of multiple correspondence analysis. 
Source: authors’ elaboration.
1 Selected variables and mode are: Turnover (1-49 million EUR; 50-
99 million EUR; 100 or more million EUR); type of first customer
(GMS, International wholesalers, National wholesalers, Specialized
networks); type of first supplier (Producers, exporters, Wholesalers,
Cooperatives); Certification of company (yes or no); companies are
certified to customer demand (yes or no); Certification of suppliers
(yes or no); effort on safety of companies (0-9 analyses per year,
10-99 analyses per year, 100 or more analyses per year). The first
three variables were taken as active variables in the analysis, while
the other as supplementary variables.
NEW MEDIT N. 3/2016
ternational buyers, retailers and companies in the trade of prod-
ucts. In the new international economics literature, there is a
burgeoning literature that explores the great role played by in-
termediaries in the trade process. 
With our work we are placed in this field of research with a
direct survey carried out on Italian importers. We observed fruit
and vegetable international buyers and we could say that the I-
talian system is characterized from three profiles of importers.
We see certified-chain where the level of certification is higher
and these enterprises do, in absolute terms, significant efforts in
safety controls, but proportionally less according to volume of
imports. In this group we have companies with higher turnover.
Differentiating certified chain is characterized from a not for-
malized chain (unwritten relationship contracts) with first sup-
pliers. They don’t have own production in North Mediterranean
countries. These companies are certified, differentiated typolo-
gy of clients and must not provide significant health efforts.
In the last category the companies have smaller turnover and
they are not certified and don’t provide a significant health effort.
They mainly work for national and international wholesalers.
In conclusion, this study focused on differentiated behav-
iours in terms of food safety efforts within this voluntary pro-
gramme. We have showed that the firm size influence strategic
behaviour of Italian fruit and vegetables importers face to food
safety regulation, according to brand reputation and product
specialization. 
The type of supply chain affects the importers strategies en-
couraging them to implement stricter standards, as private stan-
dards, with respect to public law in order to meet customer
needs and provide a sufficient degree of differentiation. These
strategies, however, are not always aimed at obtaining a price
premium, but are taken above all to ensure the maintenance of
the reputation of the companies towards the most demanding
customers and stabilize its market share.
Strategic business decisions are based on arbitrage between
costs and at the private level benefits associated with implement-
ing additional standards and efforts, while publicly derive from
complex trade-off between security imperatives of the consumer,
market rules and economic criteria. In the public-private strategic
game, in which public authorities and private operators interact in
determining the level of quality and safety of products offered to
consumers, there is room for different strategies.
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